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This article examines the South African approach to the rectification of agreements subject
to constitutive formal requirements. It focuses on the rule that such an agreement must first
comply with formalities ex facie the document recording it, before a court may consider
whether the traditional requirements for rectification have been met. In particular, the
primary justifications for this rule are assessed: first, a void agreement cannot be rectified
and, secondly, ex facie compliance promotes the functions of formalities. An analysis of
South African case law reveals not only that these assumptions are questionable, but that
the rule is inconsistently applied and leads to the drawing of tenuous distinctions. A brief
investigation of both civilian and common-law approaches suggests further that the South
African method is based on a misconception of the purpose of rectification: it conflates the
correction of the document recording the agreement with the enforcement of that agreement
once it is corrected. This leads to the conclusion that the requirement of ex facie compliance
should be abolished as a preliminary step and that a South African court should rather
consider whether awarding a claim for rectification would defeat the objects of formalities in
general.
I INTRODUCTION
In Magwaza v Heenan,1 the Appellate Division was confronted with the
question whether a document recording an agreement subject to constitutive
formalities could be rectiﬁed,2 in spite of the fact that the written agreement
did not comply with those formalities. After considering divergent opinions
in both case law and academic commentary,3 the court concluded that an
agreement subject to constitutive formal requirements must ﬁrst comply
with those requirements ex facie the document recording the transaction
before the agreement may be rectiﬁed, because there cannot be rectiﬁcation
of a formally invalid agreement.4 To hold otherwise, would be ‘in theory
* This article is based on research undertaken in fulﬁlment of the requirements
for the LLD degree at the Faculty of Law, University of Stellenbosch. I am grateful
for the ﬁnancial assistance received in this regard from the National Research
Foundation.
† BALLB LLD (Stell).
1 1979 (2) SA1019 (A).
2 Constitutive formalities are those which result in nullity in the event of non-
compliance (in this article, ‘formalities’ and ‘statutory formalities’ are used to refer to
these types of formal requirements only). Typical examples are formalities prescribed
by s 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 and s 6 of the General Law
AmendmentAct 50 of 1956.
3 Magwaza supra note 1 at 1024G–1028A.
4 Ibid at 1028A–B.
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subversive of the [functions of] statutory formalities, and in practice . . . must
inevitably prove emasculatory of them’.5
The consequence of the Magwaza decision is that South African courts
must adopt a two-step approach to the rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to
constitutive formal requirements. First, ex facie the document, there must be
compliance with those formalities.6 Thereafter, a court must be satisﬁed that
the party seeking rectiﬁcation has met the traditional requirements of the
remedy: he must prove that the parties at least shared a common intention
which they intended to express in their written agreement, but which they
failed to do by virtue of a mistake.7
The ostensible simplicity of this two-step approach does not immediately
strike one as deserving of an in-depth analysis and discussion. However, the
recent judgment in Osborne & another v West Dunes Properties 176 (Edms) Bpk
& others8 suggests otherwise. In that case, a claim for rectiﬁcation of a deed of
alienation was refused for the following two reasons, among others: ﬁrst, the
real agreement (a description used to refer to the agreement once rectiﬁed9)
would be void for vagueness because the actual purchaser could not be
identiﬁed10 and, secondly, the written agreement was invalid because it did
not identify the purchaser in terms of the real agreement (although it did
identify a purchaser).11
Because the court applied the two-step approach in the incorrect order, its
conclusions are problematic in view of the current approach to rectiﬁcation
of agreements subject to constitutive formalities. These conclusions will be
considered in greater detail elsewhere in this article. However, over and
above such technical considerations, the Osborne judgment raises a funda-
mental question: if the two-step approach to the rectiﬁcation of agreements
subject to constitutive formalities is self-evident, why does it continue to
create difﬁculties in application, when South African courts have had more
than 30 years to iron out any problems caused by the Magwaza decision?
It therefore seems appropriate to re-evaluate the necessity for this two-step
method where constitutive formalities are concerned. I propose to focus on
the two interrelated justiﬁcations presented for the ﬁrst step: ex facie
compliance with such formalities. The ﬁrst is the notion that non-
compliance renders the agreement void and therefore precludes rectiﬁcation.
The second is the argument that rectiﬁcation of a non-compliant agreement
creates uncertainty and the possibility of perjured claims and is therefore
5 Ibid at 1028B–C.
6 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC 1996 (2) SA 246 (N) at
254E; Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles [1999] 2All SA304 (A) para 10.
7 See for example Meyer v Merchants’ Trust Ltd 1942 AD 244 at 253; Lazarus v
Gorfinkel 1988 (4) SA 123 (C) at 131D; Humphrys v Laser Transport Holdings Ltd 1994
(4) SA388 (C) at 395H.
8 2013 (6) SA105 (WCC).
9 Ibid para 19.
10 Ibid paras 27–30.
11 Ibid para 35.
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contrary to the intention underlying the imposition of statutory formalities.
In what follows, the cogency of these arguments will be considered, in view
of the approach adopted in other legal systems. However, it is necessary to
make preliminary remarks regarding certain basic principles informing the
treatment of constitutive formal requirements in South African law to place
the ﬁrst step in context. This is the topic of the next part of the article.
II CONSTITUTIVE FORMALITIES, RECTIFICATION AND THE
REQUIREMENT OF EX FACIE COMPLIANCE
Both s 2(1) of the Alienation of LandAct 68 of 198112 and s 6 of the General
LawAmendment Act 50 of 1956 require that the parties’ contract must be in
writing in order to be valid.13 The reason is because sales of land and
suretyships are regarded as so commercially important, or as involving
obligations of such an onerous nature that formal requirements are imposed
in addition to those normally required for the conclusion of a valid
contract.14 These formal requirements ensure that there is proper proof of the
existence and content of the agreement (an evidentiary function);15 they
cause parties to pause and think more seriously about the transaction into
which they are entering and draw attention to any potentially onerous
obligations which may be assumed upon contract conclusion (a cautionary
function);16 and they delineate the transition from negotiation to conclusion
of the contract (a channelling function).17
The outcome of obliging parties to embody their agreement in a
document is to place limitations on the use of extrinsic evidence. First, there
is the rule that the terms of a contract that is required by law to be in writing
must appear from the document itself: where the recordal is incomplete, it
cannot be supplemented by extrinsic evidence.18 To admit extrinsic evi-
dence in this instance would subvert at least some of the objects of formalities
legislation, namely to minimise uncertainty and disputes.
Secondly, if a contract constitutes the exclusive memorial of the agree-
ment, the parol evidence rule also precludes the admission of extrinsic
evidence, to the extent that it adds to, varies or contradicts the written
provisions (this rule applies irrespective of whether formalities are
12 Read together with the deﬁnition of ‘alienation’and ‘deed of alienation’ in s 1.
13 R H Christie & G B Bradﬁeld Christie’s The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed
(2011) 131; Legator McKenna Inc v Shea 2010 (1) SA35 (SCA) para 18 (land); Fourlamel
(Pty) Ltd v Maddison 1977 (1) SA333 (A) at 341G–H (suretyship).
14 Wilken v Kohler 1913AD 135 at 142; Fourlamel supra note 13 at 342H–343B.
15 See for example Lon L Fuller ‘Consideration and form’ (1941) 41 Columbia LR
799 at 800.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid at 801.
18 Van Wyk v Rottcher’s Saw Mills (Pty) Ltd 1948 (1) SA 983 (A) at 989; African
Lumber Co (Pvt) Ltd v Katz 1978 (4) SA432 (C) at 434H–435A; Industrial Development
Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd v Silver 2003 (1) SA365 (SCA) para 9.
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imposed).19 The rationale for the parol evidence rule is that it is supposed to
promote certainty, minimise disputes and restrict the risk of perjury.20 Where
a contract is statutorily required to be reduced to writing, the parol evidence
rule therefore tends to be supportive of the functions served by formalities
themselves.21
It follows that a rule which stipulates that the document is the sole record
of the parties’ agreement, and related rules which prohibit the admission of
extrinsic evidence, can lead to inequitable results where the document does
not correctly record the parties’ actual agreement. Indeed, one of the primary
criticisms directed at formal requirements in general is the fact that they
create the opportunity for a party to rely on a technical defence in order to
escape an agreement which was seriously intended.22
It is for this reason that rectiﬁcation is a necessary remedy, because it is
designed to correct a document which is an inaccurate reﬂection of the
parties’ agreement.23 Although the exact origins of the remedy remain
unclear,24 its underlying rationale is that ‘in contracts regard must be had to
19 Union Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd 1941 AD 43 at 47.
Although the parol evidence rule will be referred to as an indivisible concept in this
article, there is authority for the fact that the rule itself consists of two independent
sub-rules, namely the ‘integration rule’ (which determines the extent to which
extrinsic evidence may be used to prove the terms of the written contract) and the
‘interpretation rule’ (which determines the extent to which extrinsic evidence is
admissible to interpret the meaning of the terms used in that contract) — Johnston v
Leal 1980 (3) SA 927 (A) at 943A; S W J van der Merwe, L F van Huyssteen, M F B
Reinecke & G F Lubbe Contract: General Principles 4 ed (2012) 149; Christie & Brad-
ﬁeld op cit note 13 at 200–1, 212. However, for current purposes nothing turns on
this distinction between the two sub-rules.
20 See for example Du Plessis v Nel 1952 (1) SA 513 (A) at 534C–E, per Van den
Heever JA; G F Lubbe & C Murray Farlam & Hathaway Contract — Cases, Materials
and Commentary 3 ed (1988) 216n2; Van derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 152–3.
21 Arthur LCorbin ‘The parol evidence rule’ (1944) 53 Yale LJ 603 at 609.
22 Lubbe & Murray op cit note 20 at 206n4; A J Kerr The Principles of The Law of
Contract 6 ed (2002) 146;AD J van Rensburg & S HTreisman The Practioner’s Guide to
the Alienation of Land Act 2 ed (1984) 23; Van Wyk supra note 18 at 989; Senekal v Home
Sites (Pty) Ltd 1950 (1) SA 139 (W) at 150; Exdev (Pty) Ltd v Pekudei Investments (Pty)
Ltd 2011 (2) SA282 (SCA) para 1.
23 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 11.
24 One view is that that the remedy is English in origin and that it was received
in South African law as a necessary exception to the English parol evidence rule
(see for example Saayman v Le Grange (1879) 9 Buch 10 at 12 (per De Villiers CJ)
and 13 (per Dwyer J); Meyer supra note 7 at 253, per De Wet CJ; Venter v Liebenberg
1954 (3) SA 333 (T) at 338C; Brits v Van Heerden 2001 (3) SA 257 (C) at 266D–E,
278F; Von Ziegler v Superior Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1962 (3) SA 399 (T) at
410A–C; H J Liebenberg ‘Die begrip ‘‘mutual error’’ by rektiﬁkasie van kontrakte’
(1994) 15 Obiter 137; D T Zeffertt &APaizes Parol Evidence with Particular Reference to
Contract (1986) 10).Another view is that rectiﬁcation has civilian roots and is based on
the exceptio doli (Weinerlein v Goch Buildings Ltd 1925 AD 282 at 292–3 (per Wessels
JA) and 296–7 (per Kotze JA); Neuhoff v York Timbers Ltd 1981 (4) SA666 (T) at 673E;
Mouton v Hanekom 1959 (3) SA35 (A) at 40A–B; Van Aswegen v Fourie 1964 (3) SA94
(O) at 98A; Otto v Heymans 1971 (4) SA 148 (T) at 156A-B). A third view is that the
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the truth of the matter rather than to what has been written, and the mistake
must yield to the truth’.25 However, the equitable operation of rectiﬁcation
is limited in the context of agreements subject to constitutive formalities,
precisely because South African courts assume that the recordal itself
constitutes the sole embodiment of the parties’ intentions and further, they
assume that this conclusion promotes the functions of formalities.
III THE FIRST JUSTIFICATION: (FORMAL) VALIDITY AS A
PREREQUISITE TO RECTIFICATION
(a) Introduction
The following two examples illustrate the theoretical basis for the require-
ment that an agreement must appear to be formally valid before it can be
rectiﬁed. In the ﬁrst example, the document records a sale of land. Ex facie
the document, the description of the land is so deﬁcient that it cannot be
identiﬁed with reasonable certainty. On the face of it, the document
therefore appears to record a void agreement because it lacks a sufﬁcient
description of one of the essential terms required to be in writing by the
Alienation of LandAct.26 In the second example, a document records the sale
of shares. The document contains a term which amounts to the giving of
ﬁnancial assistance for the purchase of the shares, in contravention of the
relevant company legislation.27 Ex facie the document, this sale also appears
to be void. However, in a claim for rectiﬁcation, a court will rectify the
document in the second example but not the ﬁrst.
The reason for these different outcomes is explained in Spiller v Lawrence:28
‘The two situations are fundamentally different. In the [second example], when
the question of validity relates to the substance of the transaction and not its
form, nullity is an illusion produced by a document testifying falsely to what
was agreed. In the [ﬁrst example], . . . the cause of nullity is indeed to be found
in the transaction’s form. When it is said to consist of a failure to observe the
law’s requirement that the agreement be reﬂected by a document with
particular characteristics the document itself is necessarily decisive of the issue
whether the stipulation has been met; for it has been only if this emerges from
remedy is neither an exception to the parol evidence rule, nor based on the exceptio
doli, but is simply a reﬂection of the general rule that a contract is binding because of
the parties’ consensus or a reasonable reliance on consensus (Van der Merwe et al op
cit note 19 at 153–4; Strydom v Coach Motors (Edms) Bpk 1975 (4) SA 838 (T) at
840E–F).
25 Benjamin v Gurewitz 1973 (1) SA 418 (A) at 426C–D, per van Blerk JA. See also
Weinerlein supra note 24 at 289, per DeVilliers JA.
26 South African courts do not require meticulous accuracy in the recordal of the
terms of an agreement subject to formal requirements. It is sufﬁcient if the content of
a term is objectively ascertainable — Van Wyk supra note 18 at 989; Clements v
Simpson 1971 (3) SA1 (A) at 7F.
27 This example is taken from the facts of Spiller v Lawrence 1976 (1) SA307 (N).
28 Supra note 27.
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the document. Appearance and reality therefore coincide. Nullity, when the
document shows it, is no illusion.’29
Therefore, when a court is asked to rectify a document for which statutory
formalities are not prescribed, a distinction can be drawn between the
document recording the agreement and the underlying agreement itself.
Provided the underlying agreement is valid,
‘it follows inevitably that at the heart of the matter lies, not a void transaction,
but a valid transaction incorrectly documented [and] the particular effect of the
mistake in the document is wrongly to give the impression of nullity.’30
However, in the case of an agreement subject to formalities, there is no
distinction between the underlying agreement and the document, because the
prescribed formalities are constitutive in nature: the document and the obliga-
tion come into existence simultaneously. The document no longer serves simply
as the evidence of the agreement; it is the agreement.31 When such a document
does not comply with formalities, no obligation is created and consequently
there is nothing to rectify32 —hence the necessity for the ﬁrst step.
South African courts consistently require ex facie compliance with
constitutive formalities as a prerequisite to a successful claim for rectiﬁcation.
One would expect uniformity in the courts’ approach to such an apparently
self-evident requirement, but a careful study of case law on the point reveals
that uniformity here is itself an illusion. It will also become apparent that
there are in fact two dimensions to the question whether the document
appears to record a valid transaction. The ﬁrst is whether a court adopts a
strict or lenient approach to formal validity. The second is whether the
notion of ex facie compliance relates to formal validity only or also to
substantive validity. The following analysis of these aspects does not purport
to be exhaustive; the cases which are examined have been chosen simply
because they best illustrate the points I wish to make.33
29 Ibid at 312B–D.
30 Ibid at 311D.
31 Van derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 157.
32 This point is conﬁrmed in Milner Street Properties (Pty) Ltd v Eckstein Properties
(Pty) Ltd 2001 (4) SA 1315 (SCA) para 26, where Nienaber JA states that ‘where
compliance with the statutory formalities is a prerequisite for the actual formation of
an agreement, a failure to comply means that nothing is constituted and consequently
there is by deﬁnition nothing that can be rectiﬁed’.
33 Amore detailed discussion is available in Franziska Elizabeth Myburgh Statutory
Formalities in South African Law (unpublished LLD thesis, Stellenbosch University,
2013) 157–78. The dissertation is available electronically at http://hdl.handle.net/
10019.1/80135.
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(b) The two dimensions of the validity requirement
(i) A strict versus a lenient approach to formal validity
Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC34 and Intercontinental
Exports (Pty) Ltd v Fowles35 are discussed here as representative of a strict and a
lenient approach to formal validity respectively.
In Republican Press the plaintiff sought to rectify a deed of suretyship in
which the name ‘Republican Press (Pty) Ltd’ was erroneously inserted as
both the principal debtor and the creditor. It was common cause that the
parties had agreed on the identities of all the relevant parties, prior to
reducing their agreement to writing.36 Counsel for the plaintiff argued that
there was ex facie compliance with the relevant formalities (albeit two of the
three parties identiﬁed shared the same name)37 or, alternatively, if there was
doubt about whether the document complied with the relevant formalities,
then the prevailing judicial trend was to interpret the document in such a
manner as to render it formally valid, in order to proceed with rectiﬁcation.38
With regard to the ﬁrst argument, it was suggested that there was nothing
on the face of the document to indicate that it was formally invalid; this was
not a situation where the name of one of the parties had been completely
omitted, for example. In support of this argument, an analogy was drawn
with the situation where two of the parties to the suretyship were apparently
identiﬁed as the same natural person, but were in fact father and son. In such a
case, the document could not be presumed to be formally invalid.39 Hurt J,
writing for the majority, responded to this argument by indicating that ﬁrst,
in a situation such as that, rectiﬁcation would be unnecessary. If formal
invalidity were pleaded, it could be met with the replication that the two
parties were in fact related to each other.40 Secondly, extrinsic evidence
would be admissible to identify these parties as father and son. According to
the judge, such evidence would always be admissible in cases of doubt as to
whether there were in fact three parties identiﬁed in the document.41
However, because the court was confronted with a document which
identiﬁed two of the three parties as ‘Republican Press (Pty) Ltd’, and
because there cannot be two companies with the same name, there could be
no doubt that the document was referring to the same party as both principal
debtor and creditor, and was for that reason formally invalid.42
Furthermore, the court disagreed with the contention that in cases of
doubt as to whether a document was formally valid, it would adopt an
34 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6.
35 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6.
36 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 256G–H.
37 Ibid at 251C.
38 Ibid at 251I.
39 Ibid at 251B–D.
40 Ibid at 251E–F.
41 Ibid at 251F–G.
42 Ibid at 251G–H.
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interpretation which favoured validity above invalidity. According to the
court, there were no cases where such a statement had been explicitly
made.43 The decision in Magwaza was also, it said, a clear indication that the
policy considerations underlying the imposition of formalities took prece-
dence over the equitable considerations underlying the remedy of rectiﬁca-
tion, in spite of the fact that formalities may not be the best way to promote
these policy considerations and that ex facie compliance with statutory
formalities as a prerequisite to rectiﬁcation could also lead to anomalous
results.44 Finally, where there seemed to be an implication that a benign
approach should be adopted in determining whether there had been
compliance with formalities, as in Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason,45 this
was either wrong or at best confusing.46
In closing, Hurt J made the following remark:
‘[A] strict approach to the test of whether the document ostensibly complies
with the statute is [not], in practice, all that unfair to the parties. The creditor is
invariably the party who stipulates for a suretyship undertaking as a condition
for the giving, or prolonging, of terms of credit. He is the party who beneﬁts
from the undertaking by having an extra debtor, or debtors, against whom he
can proceed in the event of default by the principal debtor. It is little enough to
ask of him to ensure that, when the undertaking is executed, it has the correct
names in the correct places and, as I understand the purport of the decisions of
the Appellate Division, a creditor who omits this simple step may ﬁnd that he
has . . . to ‘‘dree his weird’’.’47
Although apparently an obiter remark, this justiﬁcation for a strict approach
confuses the ﬁrst step — formal validity — with the requirements of the
second step, namely the elements to be proved in order to succeed with a
claim for rectiﬁcation. More speciﬁcally, it appears as if the judge was
resurrecting, perhaps indirectly, the notion that the party seeking rectiﬁca-
tion must prove that the mistake is reasonable.48 There is no reason for such a
43 Ibid at 251I–252A.
44 Ibid at 253A–D, 255B–E.
45 1988 (2) SA78 (D).
46 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 253E–254I. Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty)
Ltd supra note 45 is discussed in part III(b)(ii) below.
47 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 255E–G.
48 See for example cases like Van der Byl v Van der Byl & Co 1899 16 SC 338 at 349,
per De Villiers CJ; Quinn v Goldschmidt 1910 EDL158 at 164; Patel v Le Clus (Pty) Ltd
1946 TPD 30 at 34; Bushby v Guardian Assurance Co 1915 WLD 65 at 71 and the
statement by Kerr op cit note 22 at 157–9:
‘[T]he line of distinction [to determine which errors will be corrected] lies
between, on the one hand, cases in which parties give the problem [of the recordal
of an essential term] the consideration it requires and take care over the recording
of their agreement but overlook an error of commission or omission; and, on the
other hand, cases in which they give the problem little consideration or make no
serious attempt to complete their contract in writing. . . . What is fatal is language
so obscure, or an omission of such a nature, that when the parties look at the
document(s) before signing they should realise that the requirements of the statute
in question have not been fulﬁlled.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
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requirement, because both parties know what the true agreement is.
Reasonableness in the context of dissensus and mistake is imposed in order to
protect the party who relies on the agreement as it appears to be; in the
context of rectiﬁcation, both parties are usually aware of the fact that the
ostensible agreement does not reﬂect their actual agreement and neither
party therefore needs the additional protection that the mistake should be
reasonable.49
A second, more lenient approach to the ﬁrst step is found in Intercontinental
Exports. The suretyship identiﬁed the principal debtor as ‘Mr Frank Fowles’
while the surety was described as ‘Frank Turner Fowles’.50 The court
decided that although the names reﬂected as principal debtor and surety were
similar, they were not identical and, ex facie the document, did not
necessarily refer to the same person. Even if the two names had been
identical, it did not follow as a matter of course that they referred to the same
person.51 The suretyship was therefore capable of being construed ex facie
the document as reﬂecting a creditor, principal debtor and surety and was
held to comply with the statutory formalities.
The reason why Republican Press is characterised as adopting a strict
approach while Intercontinental Exports is regarded as more lenient is not
because the reasoning differs greatly: both set out to determine objectively
whether there has been compliance with statutory formalities.52 The differ-
ences lie elsewhere.
First, Intercontinental Exports recognises that formalities can be an ‘unneces-
sary stumbling-block’53 to rectiﬁcation and that a court should thus adopt an
interpretation consistent with validity where this is reasonably possible. This
seems to be a tempering of the approach adopted in Republican Press, where
there was an outright rejection of the argument that in cases of doubt, a court
should adopt an interpretation which favours formal validity rather than
invalidity.
Secondly, the leniency of the approach is reﬂected in the role it ascribes to
extrinsic evidence in determining formal validity. In Republican Press, Hurt J’s
full response to the argument that identiﬁcation of two of the three parties to
More recent cases have indicated that a reasonable mistake is not a requirement,
including Humphrys supra note 7 at 399A–I; Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Knysna
Development Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 (4) SA 24 (C) at 28F–G; Van Aswegen supra note 25 at
102B–C. See also B R Bamford ‘Rectiﬁcation in contract’ (1963) 80 SALJ 528 at
533–4.
49 J C de Wet & A H van Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en Handelsreg vol 1
5 ed (1992) 29–30.
50 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 15.
51 Ibid para 17.
52 See N J Grové ‘Republican Press (Pty) Ltd v Martin Murray Associates CC and
Others’ 1996 DJ 401 at 404; Rochelle le Roux ‘A creditor left to ‘‘dree his weird’’ ’
(1996) 4 JBL 157 at 158.
53 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 11.
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a suretyship as the same natural person does not in itself render the agreement
formally invalid was as follows:
‘It seems to me that there are two conclusive answers to this proposition. The
ﬁrst is that if there are indeed two parties to the suretyship undertaking who
have identical names, there will be no need for a rectiﬁcation of the document
and those parties would presumably be cited, and separately identiﬁed, in any
proceedings in which the document and the question of its enforceability may
come before the Court. If it were pleaded, in such a case, that the document
was invalid for non-compliance with s 6 [of the General LawAmendmentAct],
that plea could be disposed of by a replication to the effect that the identical
names referred to two different juristic personae. The second is that evidence
would be admissible for the limited purpose of identiﬁcation of the parties to
the undertaking, provided always that the evidence does not encroach into the
prohibited territory demarcated by the parol evidence rule. . . . It seems to me
that such evidence would be admissible ante omnia in any situation where there
is doubt as to whether the document refers to three separate parties to the
contract of suretyship.’54
With the last statement in the quotation, the judge appears to imply that
extrinsic evidence would always be admissible as a matter of course in order
to determine whether an agreement was formally invalid. For example, if the
suretyship identiﬁed both the debtor and surety as natural person ‘X’,
extrinsic evidence would be admissible to determine whether ‘X’ the debtor
and ‘X’ the surety were two different persons (in which case the suretyship
would be formally valid) or one and the same person (in which case the
agreement would be formally invalid).
The court in Intercontinental Exports reacted to Hurt J’s exposition as
follows:
‘With regard to the ﬁrst answer, it seems to proceed from the premise that the
suretyship undertaking is formally valid. With regard to the second, the
envisaged evidence would be admissible not to establish the document’s formal
validity, but to give effect to an otherwise valid suretyship. It would, for
example, permit extrinsic evidence to be led to identify the actual creditor,
principal debtor or surety, as the case may be, from among a group of such
named in the written document. . . . To that extent the quoted passage is not
inconsistent with the views expressed above. If by the last sentence is meant that
evidence could be led to show, contrary to what appears ex facie the document,
that a suretyship undertaking lacks formal validity (eg to show that two of the
parties are the same) I would respectfully disagree.’55
In other words, the court draws a distinction between the use of extrinsic
evidence to apply the terms of a formally valid agreement to the facts and the
use of extrinsic evidence to prove that an agreement is formally invalid, in
spite of the appearance of validity ex facie the document. To use the example
given above: extrinsic evidence is permitted to show that debtor ‘X’ and
surety ‘X’ are in fact father and son. This admission of extrinsic evidence
54 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 251D–G.
55 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 20.
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proceeds from the prior conclusion that the agreement is formally valid,
which in turn is based on the fact that the two parties are natural persons: a
reasonable interpretation in favour of formal validity assumes that the
identiﬁed parties are in fact two different people. By contrast, extrinsic
evidence would not be admissible if it were tendered for the purpose of
showing that contrary to this assumption, debtor ‘X’ and surety ‘X’ are in fact
one and the same person in reality and that the agreement is therefore
formally invalid, since such evidence would contradict the formal validity
that appears ex facie the document.56
It is in this way that Intercontinental Exports again represents a lenient
approach: it conﬁnes itself to determining formal validity by examining the
document alone. If, on the face of it, it appears to comply with statutory
requirements, then a court must conclude that the agreement is formally
valid, irrespective of whether there may be extrinsic evidence to prove the
contrary. This approach to the determination of formal validity has been
conﬁrmed in subsequent Supreme Court of Appeal decisions57 and it applies
not only where the parties have made a mistake in recording one of the
essentialia of their agreement,58 but also in cases where the parties have
mistakenly omitted a material, albeit non-essential, term.59 Provided that the
omission of the material term is not apparent from the recordal, a court will
conclude that the agreement is formally valid in the latter type of cases and
proceed to consider whether the (other) requirements for rectiﬁcation have
been met.60
56 It should be pointed out that this statement is conﬁned to extrinsic evidence
tendered for the purpose of proving formal invalidity and which contradicts what
appears to be a formally valid agreement. It is a different matter if evidence was
tendered to prove that debtor ‘X’ and surety ‘X’ are the same person because there
was no agreement upon the principal debtor for whom the surety accepted liability.
This evidence would show that there was a lack of consensus on one of the basic
elements of a suretyship, which is always admissible (see for example Johnston supra
note 19 at 945G–E).
57 Inventive Labour Structuring (Pty) Ltd v Corfe 2006 (3) SA107 (SCA) paras 7–8, 12;
Swanepoel v Nameng 2010 (3) SA 124 (SCA) para 16; Van Oudtshoorn v Investec Bank
Ltd [2011] ZASCA205 para 37.
58 Those terms which indicate that an agreement belongs to a particular class of
contract (Van derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 245).
59 For the purposes of this article, material terms are understood to amount to the
incidentalia of the agreement: those terms which supplement the essentialia and natu-
ralia (terms which are incorporated automatically due to the fact that the agreement
falls within a particular class of contract: Van der Merwe et al op cit note 19 at 246) or
which vary the naturalia of the agreement. See for example Just Names Properties 11
CC v Fourie 2007 (3) SA 1 (W) para 33 (this aspect of the judgment was not discussed
on appeal in Just Names Properties 11 CC v Fourie 2008 (1) SA 343 (SCA)); Tjakie
Naudé ‘The law of purchase and sale’ 2007 Annual Survey 1039 at 1048–9; Van der
Merwe et al op cit note 19 at 146n135, 247; Lubbe & Murray op cit note 20 at 199n4;
VanRensburg &Treisman op cit note 22 at 51–2.
60 See for example Standard Bank of SA Ltd v Cohen (1) 1993 (3) SA 846 (SE) at
853B–D; Brits supra note 24 at 270I–271B.
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In the light of this discussion, the approach in Osborne was incorrect.
There, the deed of alienation described the purchaser as ‘P J Osborne (Pty)
Ltd’, but rectiﬁcation was sought so that the corrected description would
identify the purchaser as a registered shelf company, to be bought in the
future, after which its name would be changed and inserted into the written
agreement.61
After concluding that the underlying agreement (or to use the court’s
terminology, the ‘real’ agreement) was void for vagueness, the court held
further that the written agreement was formally defective:
‘Section 2(1) of Act 68 of 1981 requires that the agreement be signed by ‘‘the
parties thereto’’. Upon a proper interpretation of this provision it obviously
refers to the true parties to the agreement. It would be absurd to construe it as
relating to the formal parties because there is no legal bond between them. It is
therefore essential that the true parties be identiﬁed in the written agreement.
In the present case the formal agreement of sale purports to record an
agreement between second plaintiff as purchaser and ﬁrst defendant as seller.
According to the allegations supporting plaintiffs’ claim for rectiﬁcation,
however, no such agreement exists. The legal bond, in terms of plaintiffs’
version, exists between ﬁrst defendant and the shelf company. The formal
agreement thus fails to identify the purchaser in terms of the true agreement of
sale. . . . As the formal document does not identify the true purchaser it is
invalid and therefore not capable of rectiﬁcation.’62
By considering the validity of the underlying agreement prior to examining
that of the written agreement, the court appears to revert to the approach
adopted in Republican Press to the extent that extrinsic evidence (the contents
of the real agreement) was relied upon to determine the validity of the
written agreement, an approach which was expressly rejected in Intercontinen-
tal Exports.
Secondly, the statement that since ‘the formal document does not identify
the true purchaser it is invalid and therefore not capable of rectiﬁcation’ is
peculiar — by deﬁnition, a party seeks rectiﬁcation of a written agreement
precisely because it does not accurately record the real or underlying
61 Osborne supra note 8 para 7. The complete, corrected description would read as
follows:
‘Die koper word verteenwoordig deur Pieter Jacobus Osborne. ’n Geregistreerde
rakmaatskappy sal vir die doel van die koop as koper aangekoop [sic] waarna ’n
gepaste beskikbare naamsverandering en reservering tot die Registrateur van
Maatskappye gerig sal word. Sodanige maatskappy se naam wat goedgekeur word
deur die Registrateur van Maatskappye, sal daarna op hierdie kontrak aangebring
word teenoor die parawe van Le Roux en Osborne.’ (‘The purchaser is
represented by Pieter Jacobus Osborne. A registered shelf company will be
purchased for the purpose of the sale as purchaser after which an appropriate
available name change and reservation will be directed towards the Registrar of
Companies. Such company name which is approved by the Registrar of Compa-
nies, will thereafter be inserted in this agreement against the initials of Le Roux and
Osborne.’)
62 Ibid paras 35–6.
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agreement. In other words, the focus should not have been on the
discrepancy between the purchaser’s recorded identity and its actual identity
for the purpose of determining whether rectiﬁcation would be permitted,
but rather on whether the written agreement complied with the prescribed
formal requirements ex facie the document. On the facts, the written
agreement did in fact so comply, because a purchaser was indeed identiﬁed.
However, Osborne does suggest that the current approach is unnecessarily
complicated and a potential source of confusion, particularly in view of the
process followed in other legal systems to determine whether an agreement
subject to constitutive formalities should be rectiﬁed. This comparative
material will be examined later in this article.
(ii) Formal versus substantive validity
Whether a court adopts a strict or lenient approach to the determination of
formal validity and ex facie compliance with statutory formalities, it is a
separate question whether such a court would rectify the document if the
agreement it embodies is substantively, as opposed to formally, invalid.
Formal validity relates to defects in the form of the transaction. Substantive
invalidity relates to the failure to comply with other requirements for
contractual validity, like legality, possibility and certainty of performance.63
As will become apparent below, South African courts limit the ambit of the
ﬁrst step so that only formal invalidity precludes the rectiﬁcation of an
agreement subject to formalities. Ostensible substantive invalidity is there-
fore not an obstacle to a claim for rectiﬁcation.
The origin of the distinction between these different ‘types’ of invalidity is
attributed to Spiller,64 although there the court was concerned with distin-
guishing between the rectiﬁcation of agreements which are not subject to
constitutive formalities and those which are. Didcott J was required to
consider whether a written agreement for the sale of shares, which included a
term that amounted to the giving of ﬁnancial assistance, could be rectiﬁed in
spite of the fact that the document, on its face, appeared to record an invalid
transaction. In concluding that it could, the judge stated that in the case of
agreements not subject to constitutive formalities, ‘nullity is an illusion
produced by a document testifying falsely to what was agreed’.65 In such a
case, a court may consider the parties’ actual agreement and, where this is
valid, rectify the document accordingly. However, in the case of agreements
which are required to comply with formalities, ‘the cause of nullity is indeed
to be found in the transaction’s form . . . [and] the document itself is
necessarily decisive of the issue whether the [formal requirements have] been
met’.66 Where formalities are constitutive, a court may not consider the
63 Van derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 157–8.
64 Spiller supra note 27. See Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd supra note 45 at 82Gff;
Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai 1997 (3) SA 1004 (SCA) at 1010D–H; Van
derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 157n223.
65 Spiller supra note 27 at 312B.
66 Ibid at 312C–D.
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parties’ actual, underlying agreement, but is conﬁned to determining
whether the document itself reﬂects a valid agreement. In other words,
where formalities are prescribed upon pain of nullity for non-compliance,
‘[a]ppearance and reality coincide’.67
Although the distinction in Spiller focused on the difference between the
rectiﬁcation of agreements not subject to formalities and the rectiﬁcation of
those which are, this distinction has also been used to limit the ambit of the
ﬁrst step in the rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to formalities. The
relevance of the distinction is as follows: where an agreement subject to
formalities is formally invalid it may not be rectiﬁed, in spite of the fact that
the parties may have a valid underlying agreement. However, if an agree-
ment complies with the relevant statutory formalities, but appears to be void
for some other reason, then a court may consider the parties’ underlying
agreement in order to determine whether the apparently (substantively)
invalid written agreement may be rectiﬁed.
An example of this is found in Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd v Jason68
where, ex facie the suretyship agreement, it seemed that the defendant had
acted on behalf of the debtor company. Throughout the document the
defendant was referred to only as a representative of the debtor company.69
According to the court, his unqualiﬁed signature as surety did not change the
fact that he had signed in his representative capacity,70 with the effect that the
principal debtor was standing surety for its own debt. On one view of the
facts and in the light of decisions like Magwaza and Spiller, the document
should not have been capable of rectiﬁcation because it did not comply with
statutory formalities. However, the very opposite was held to be the case by
Didcott J, the same judge who delivered judgment in the Spiller case.
He held that the document he was being asked to rectify did not fall within
the ambit of the rule that ‘[one] cannot by rectiﬁcation invest a document
which is on the face of it null and void with legal force’.71 According to
Didcott J, the difference between the document he was being asked to rectify
and those before courts in which the rule was upheld, like Dowdle’s Estate v
Dowdle,72 Kourie v Bean73 and Magwaza, was that in the latter cases the
descriptions of the land sold were too uncertain to constitute sufﬁcient
recordals of one of the essential terms of a contract of sale of land.74 The rule
laid down in these cases could not be said to apply to all contracts which were
required to be in writing and which appeared to be void ex facie the
document, but only to those which were void because they failed to comply
67 Ibid at 312D.
68 Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd supra note 45.
69 Ibid at 79G.
70 Ibid.
71 Dowdle’s Estate v Dowdle 1947 (3) SA340 (T) at 354.
72 Ibid.
73 1949 (2) SA567 (T).
74 Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd supra note 45 at 82C–D.
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with the relevant formal requirements.75 The judge held further that the
distinction drawn for the purposes of rectiﬁcation in the Spiller case —
between agreements which are not subject to formalities and those which are
— was only relevant when a court was faced with a claim for rectiﬁcation of
a document which failed to meet formal requirements.76 According to
Didcott J, the document that he was being asked to rectify
‘met all the formal requirements for a suretyship. [But it] showed a fault of
another sort.And it showed that wrongly. The actual agreement, the agreement
intended all along, had none. Rectiﬁcation was thus in order.’77
It is difﬁcult to determine the true import of the Litecor Voltex decision.
According to the court’s own interpretation of the deed of suretyship, the
surety had not signed in his personal capacity, but as representative of the
debtor company. Therefore, it would appear that the document was formally
invalid, since it failed to identify three distinct parties as creditor, debtor and
surety.78 On this interpretation, no distinction should have been drawn
between the documents in Magwaza, Dowdle and Kourie on the one hand,
and the document in Litecor Voltex on the other, because they all failed to
identify an essential term of the agreement.
However, Litecor Voltex has also been interpreted as an example of a case
where the document is formally valid, but appears to be substantively
invalid.79 Even though the surety signed the document in his representative
capacity, three separate names appeared ex facie the document. Such an
interpretation would explain Didcott J’s statement that the document ‘met all
the formal requirements for a suretyship’ despite the fact that the surety had
signed in the incorrect capacity. Such an interpretation would also explain
how Didcott J found support for his reasoning in the Spiller case. According
to the judge,
75 Ibid at 82E–F.
76 Ibid at 83C–D.
77 Ibid at 83D–E.
78 See also Van der Merwe et al op cit note 19 at 158n226; Republican Press (Pty) Ltd
supra note 6 at 254A–D, where Hurt J was of the opinion that on one interpretation
at least, the document in Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd supra note 45 was formally
invalid.
79 Lubbe &Murray op cit note 20 at 235n4:
‘[Litecor Voltex] extends the reasoning in [Spiller] to contracts governed by
statutory formalities. A mistake in the expression of the parties creating the
impression of [substantive] invalidity may be rectiﬁed provided that the docu-
ment on the face of it complies with the statutory requirements.’
See also Nuform Formwork and Scaffolding (Pty) Ltd v Natscaff CC [2002] 4 All SA 575
(D) at 581; Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 254H; Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty)
Ltd supra note 64 at 1010G.
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‘[t]he distinction drawn [in Spiller] for the purposes of rectiﬁcation between
contracts governed by formal requirements and the rest free from such mattered
. . . only when those on which they called did not duly answer them.’80
This is a somewhat ingenious argument. The Spiller case was not concerned
with the rectiﬁcation of an agreement subject to formalities, but sought
rather to indicate why a written agreement not subject to formalities but
which appeared to be void could be rectiﬁed, whereas an agreement for
which writing is constitutive could not be so rectiﬁed. In the former, the
writing is not constitutive and a distinction can be drawn between the
written record of the agreement and the agreement itself. Such a distinction
cannot be drawn in cases where formalities are prescribed upon pain of
nullity. However, in Litecor Voltex Didcott J applies this reasoning to
agreements subject to formalities by distinguishing between instances where
such an agreement does not comply with formal requirements (and therefore
cannot be rectiﬁed) and an agreement which does comply but appears to be
invalid for some other reason (in which case a court may consider the parties’
underlying agreement). In other words, the judge assumed that in the event
of formal invalidity, the document is the sole embodiment of the parties’
agreement and no distinction can be drawn between the recordal and that
agreement. However, when the document recording the agreement com-
plies with the relevant formal requirements but appears to be substantively
invalid, then such a distinction can be drawn between the document and the
underlying agreement.
This approach is of course inconsistent with the theory underlying the
imposition of the ﬁrst step in the rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to
formalities. The document constitutes the embodiment of the parties’
agreement and it is surely the document which must be considered to
determine whether the agreement complies with both formal and substantive
requirements. If the document is the sole manifestation of the parties’
agreement and bearing in mind the rule that a void agreement cannot be
rectiﬁed, then both substantive and formal invalidity should preclude
rectiﬁcation.As Van der Merwe and others have pointed out,
‘[i]n a case governed by statutory formalities it is arguable that the legal act is
fully identiﬁed with its documentary manifestation. As a matter of logic, it
might therefore be contended that the proper analysis is, in the words of
Didcott J in the Spiller case, that ‘‘appearance and reality coincide. . . . Nullity,
when the document shows it, is no illusion’’, and that rectiﬁcation ought to be
excluded.’81
Nevertheless, the effect of the Litecor Voltex decision is to limit the ambit of
the ﬁrst step so that it only precludes the rectiﬁcation of a document which
does not appear to be formally valid; in the case of (mere) substantive
80 Litecor Voltex (Natal) (Pty) Ltd supra note 45 at 83C–D. To clarify: the distinction
is only important where contracts subject to formalities do not comply with those
formalities.
81 Van derMerwe et al op cit note 19 at 158.
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invalidity ex facie the document, it seems that a court is entitled to have
regard to the parties’ ‘actual’ agreement.
This limitation of the ambit of ﬁrst step is also apparent in cases where
there is no doubt whatsoever that statutory formalities have been properly
complied with, but where the document appears to reﬂect a substantively
invalid agreement. For example, in Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd v Ping Bai82
the court ordered rectiﬁcation of a deed of alienation which complied with
statutory formalities but which, ex facie the document, appeared to relate to
the sale of erven in an unproclaimed township. Such a sale was prohibited by
certain ordinances and the failure to heed this prohibition rendered the sale
void.83 However, as in Litecor Voltex, the Supreme Court of Appeal
interpreted the Spiller distinction as prohibiting the rectiﬁcation of agree-
ments subject to formalities only in cases where the document fails to identify
an essential term and is therefore formally invalid.84 Where, as here, the
document indicated compliance with statutory formalities but had the
appearance of substantive invalidity, the court was entitled to consider the
parties’ underlying agreement (which was not invalid) and to rectify the
document accordingly, by inserting the correct description of the land sold.85
Both the lenient approach to formal invalidity and the judicial tendency to
rectify agreements subject to formalities where they appear to be substan-
tively invalid only, represent attempts to navigate the tension between giving
effect to the policy considerations underlying statutory formalities on the one
hand, and the need to do justice on the other.86 However, the question arises
whether such judicial navigation, which often results in drawing tenuous
distinctions, could not have been avoided altogether in the absence of the
ﬁrst step.
(c) Is the validity requirement necessary?
It would appear that not all courts subscribe to the rule that constitutive
formalities preclude consideration of any underlying agreement or prior
intention independent of the document for the purposes of determining ex
facie compliance.At least in Osborne and Litecor Voltex, as well as in those cases
where substantive invalidity was clear ex facie the document, the court
82 Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty) Ltd supra note 64.
83 Ibid at 1010B.
84 Ibid at 1010D–H.
85 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 19 at 158 cite Engelbrecht v Nel 1991 (2) SA 549
(W) as an example of a judgment where the apparent substantive invalidity ex facie
the document precluded its rectiﬁcation, thus contradicting Headerman (Vryburg) (Pty)
Ltd supra note 64. However, it is suggested that the authors overlooked the prevailing
judicial tendency which characterises the requirement that the terms of an agreement
subject to formalities should be reasonably ascertainable as a formal, rather than sub-
stantive, requirement (see Engelbrecht ibid at 552C–D; Hartland Implemente (Edms) Bpk
v Enal Eiendomme 2002 (3) SA653 (NC) at 667G–I). Upon such an interpretation, the
agreement in Engelbrecht was therefore formally, and not substantively, invalid.
86 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 11; Papenfus v Steyn 1969 (1)
SA92 (T) at 98D–E.
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recognised the separate existence of such an underlying agreement.Although
I shall also evaluate the approaches discussed above and their implications for
the policy concerns informing the imposition of the ﬁrst step, certain
preliminary points of criticism of the position that a document which does
not comply with statutory formalities cannot be rectiﬁed, will be considered
here.
First, it is unclear whether the authority cited in Magwaza actually supports
the conclusion that an agreement which is subject to constitutive formalities
cannot be rectiﬁed if it does not ﬁrst comply with those formalities. The
court relied on a statement in Dowdle,87 which in turn appeared to be relying
on the following portion of De Villiers JA’s judgment in Weinerlein v Goch
Buildings Ltd:88
‘By putting the agreement in writing and signing it the parties have complied
with the provisions of s 30 [of Transvaal Proclamation 8 of 1902]. So far,
therefore, as that section is concerned, the agreement stands. . . . We were
pressed with the decision of the Transvaal Supreme Court in the case of Jolly v
Herman’s Executors 1903 TS 515 in which it was laid down that there is no
vinculum juris between the parties to a mineral contract as long as the contract
has not been notarially executed and duly registered in accordance with the
Volksraad Besluit. It was urged that Jolly’s case gives a person a right to resile as
long as the provisions of the Volksraad Besluit have not been complied with and
that the plaintiffs have a similar right in the present case. . . . But there is
nothing inconsistent in this view of s 30 with the decision in Jolly’s case. No
doubt s 30 gives either party the right to refuse to complete the agreement
before it has been put into writing and signed, but there is nothing in the
section to compel the same conclusion where the agreement has been reduced
to writing and signed. The two cases differ toto caelo. In the one case there is no
contract between the parties, who are free to go on with the contract or not as
they please. In the other there is a concluded contract between them, contractus
absolutus et perfectus est. (C 4.21.17; C 4.38.15; Faber C 4.16.14; Perezius C
21.10.)’89
Botha J expressed doubt in Vogel NO v Volkersz90 whether De Villiers JA’s
judgment supported the general proposition that non-compliance with
statutory formalities rendered a written agreement incapable of rectiﬁcation.
As the judge pointed out, the court in Weinerlein was confronted with the
question whether rectiﬁcation of a written agreement for the sale of land,
which complied with the relevant formalities but which failed to describe the
merx accurately, would be contrary to the relevant statutory formalities. It
87 Magwaza supra note 1 at 1025A.
88 Weinerlein supra note 24. In Dowdle’s Estate supra note 71 at 354, Dowling AJ
does not indicate which judgment in the Weinerlein case implies that non-compliance
with statutory formalities precludes rectiﬁcation. However, in Vogel NO v Volkersz
1977 (1) SA 537 (T) at 557A–B, Botha J indicates that it is that part of De Villiers JA’s
judgment quoted in the main text above. This portion of De Villiers JA’s judgment is
also cited in Magwaza supra note 1 at 1025E–H.
89 Weinerlein supra note 24 at 290, per DeVilliers JA.
90 Vogel NO supra note 88 at 557A.
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was not asked to consider what the case would be if the agreement did not
comply with statutory formalities.91
Malan goes even further and argues that De Villiers JA’s judgment could
be interpreted to mean that the mere reduction of an agreement subject
to constitutive formalities to a signed document is sufﬁcient for a court to
consider its rectiﬁcation.92 According to him,93 the quoted portion of the
judgment should be understood in the light of the argument made by counsel
for the plaintiffs to the effect that the absence of a valid, antecedent contract
between the parties precluded rectiﬁcation of the document in order to
reﬂect the parties’ actual agreement. This was because
‘[t]o seek to bind the plaintiffs to such a contract . . . it is not a sufﬁcient
compliance with the section to show that there is a writing signed by both
parties, unless each term of the antecedent verbal agreement has been embodied
in the writing. In the absence of such a term in the instrument the plaintiff
cannot be said to have agreed to that term because he has not agreed to it in
writing.’94
According to Malan, DeVilliers JA’s response indicates that all that is required
is that there must be an instrument which can be rectiﬁed; the fact that it
reﬂects a void contract is neither here nor there.95 Furthermore, the purpose
of drawing the distinction with Jolly was simply to indicate that in that case,
the basic formal requirements of notarial execution and registration had not
been complied with, and as a result there was nothing to rectify.96 Malan
argues that where writing only is prescribed, and the parties have complied
with this requirement, there is something to rectify, albeit not a fully
enforceable and valid contract.97
Such an interpretation of De Villiers JA’s judgment appears to resonate in
the judgment ofWessels JA, where he states that
‘[a]ll therefore, that sec. 30 says in effect is that the Courts will not recognise any
contract of sale as a legal act unless it is in writing, but once the contract is in
writing the Court will not allow it to be used as an engine of fraud to extort
from an adversary what the claimant knows that he never was entitled to and in
order to prevent this it will cause the written contract . . . to be rectiﬁed’.98
Furthermore, Malan’s interpretation would appear to be more in line with
the equitable origins of the remedy of rectiﬁcation. All three judgments in
the Weinerlein case emphasise the fact that to allow a party to rely on a written
document which does not accurately reﬂect the parties’ intention is to allow
91 Ibid at 557A–C.
92 J F Malan Aspekte van Rektifikasie in die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg (unpublished
LLD thesis, University of Pretoria, 1987) 258–9.
93 Ibid at 259.
94 Weinerlein supra note 24 at 289–90.
95 Malan op cit note 92 at 259.
96 Ibid at 259.
97 Ibid at 260.
98 Weinerlein supra note 24 at 293.
THE SA APPROACH TO THE RECTIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS 805
that party to perpetrate a type of fraud.99 The imposition of the ﬁrst step,
contrary to this fraud-prevention purpose of rectiﬁcation (and, incidentally,
of formalities), allows a party to rely on the formal invalidity of the
document, in spite of the fact that the parties may have orally agreed on all
the particulars of their agreement. This does not seem to be consistent with
the equitable nature of the remedy of rectiﬁcation emphasised in the
Weinerlein case.
Despite the possible merits of Malan’s argument, it does display some
weaknesses. For example he, like Dowling AJ in the Dowdle case, appears to
lose sight of the fact that the court had not been asked to consider whether
the rectiﬁcation of an agreement which did not comply with constitutive
formalities would be possible. Furthermore, it is arguable that the relaxation
of the prior concluded contract requirement has nothing to do with whether
a formally invalid agreement can be rectiﬁed, but rather with what must be
proved in order to succeed with a claim for rectiﬁcation.100 Nevertheless,
Malan’s interpretation of De Villiers JA’s judgment presents an apparent
solution to the problems which have arisen with the requirement that a
document must ﬁrst comply with formalities before it can be rectiﬁed.
In addition to the possibly suspect origins of the ﬁrst step, its imposition
has also led to the development of the rather tenuous distinction between
formal and substantive invalidity in an attempt to avoid it. It is unclear why
the apparent formal invalidity of a document recording an agreement subject
to formalities should preclude rectiﬁcation, whereas substantive invalidity
apparent ex facie the document would not. Such a distinction is illogical. If
the effect of constitutive formal requirements is to equate the document with
the parties’ agreement, then any kind of invalidity ex facie the recordal should
preclude rectiﬁcation on the basis that no obligation has been created and as a
consequence, that there is nothing to rectify.
In any event, the requirement of apparent formal validity as a prerequisite
to rectiﬁcation appears to be based on a logical error about the nature of the
remedy. Statements to the effect that ‘[one] cannot, by rectiﬁcation, invest a
document which, on the face of it, is null and void, with legal force’101 and
that ‘[being] a nullity, [an agreement subject to formalities cannot] be
rectiﬁed so as to become a valid contract’102 presuppose that rectiﬁcation, in
itself, constitutes transformation and/or enforcement of a nullity. This is
incorrect: rectiﬁcation simply corrects the document.103 As we shall see, this
99 Ibid at 288–9 (perDeVilliers JA), 292–3 (perWessels JA) and 294 (perKotze JA).
100 See note 119 below.
101 Dowdle’s Estate supra note 71 at 354.
102 Kourie supra note 73 at 572.
103 Boundary Financing Ltd v Protea Property Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2009 (3) SA447 (SCA)
para 13; Bester NO v Schmidt Bou Ontwikkelings CC 2013 (1) SA 125 (SCA) paras
10–12; Kerr op cit note 22 at 156. This point relates to a similar one made by De Wet
& Van Wyk op cit note 49 at 323n55, who remark that the approach of the courts
amounts to a conceptual confusion: rectiﬁcation does not change the contract, but
rather the document that is an inaccurate reﬂection of that contract. Louise Tager
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distinction between correction and enforcement is recognised in other legal
systems. It has also been recognised by local courts, albeit not in the context
of the rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to constitutive formalities — in
Spiller, for example, it was noted that rectiﬁcation relates to and concerns the
document, but that does not mean that the remedy is focused on the
enforcement of the agreement it reﬂects.104 In other words, a distinction can
be made between the correction of the document, which is the purpose of
rectiﬁcation, and the enforcement of the recorded agreement once cor-
rected. This distinction between correction and enforcement was conﬁrmed
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd v Shoredits
Holdings Ltd.105 The court permitted the rectiﬁcation of a written agreement
despite the possibility (and the court considered it no more than a mere
possibility) that the correction might render the written agreement too vague
to be enforced. According to the court, provided the parties’ common
intention is clear, it is irrelevant that the rectiﬁcation of the document may
have the effect that there are no longer any enforceable rights and obliga-
tions.106 In view of this conclusion, and taking into account that the written
agreement was formally valid in Osborne, the claim for rectiﬁcation should
have succeeded in spite of the fact that the written agreement, once
corrected, would have been void for failure to identify the actual purchaser
with reasonable certainty and therefore incapable of being enforced.107
‘Rectiﬁcation of invalid contracts’ (1977) 94 SALJ 8 at 11 submits that even though
the document and the obligation are said to come into existence at the same time,
they can be separated conceptually and therefore should be treated separately in a
claim for rectiﬁcation. According to these writers, rectiﬁcation should be permitted
evenwhere the document on the face of it does not comply with formalities.
104 Spiller supra note 27 at 313A–D. See also Tager op cit note 103 at 11; Lazarus
supra note 7.
105 2002 (3) SA346 (SCA).
106 Akasia Road Surfacing (Pty) Ltd supra note 105 paras 14, 16. In this regard the
court did not refer to opinions to the contrary which indicated that when rectiﬁca-
tion would be pointless, for example when the parties’prior agreement or intention is
inchoate, a court will not rectify a document. See Spiller supra note 27 at 308G;
Bamford op cit note 48 at 534; Kerr op cit note 22 at 152.
107 This is in spite of the fact that an additional reason for the refusal to award
rectiﬁcation in Osborne supra note 8 paras 38–40 was the absence of the actual pur-
chaser’s signature. This conclusion is not supported. First, the court allowed evidence
of the underlying agreement to determine the formal validity of the written agree-
ment (para 38) and secondly, if the written agreement had been rectiﬁed, the signa-
ture requirement would have been fulﬁlled by virtue of the fact that the actual
purchaser’s representative had signed on its behalf (supra note 61). The real or under-
lying agreement was therefore not invalid because the true purchaser had not signed,
but simply because the identity of true purchaser was not reasonably ascertainable. In
other words, the facts before the court were not similar to those described by Phillip
Maurice Wulfsohn Formalities in Respect of Contracts of Sale of Land Act (1980) 222
(cited in Osborne supra note 8 para 39) who deals with the signatures of natural, and
not juristic, persons.
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(d) A comparative perspective on the correction of written agreements
Civilian and common-law courts are also required to determine the extent to
which compliance with formal requirements should outweigh the need to
give effect to what the parties actually agreed upon or intended. It is therefore
appropriate to consider how they would deal with this challenge.
(i) A civilian approach to the correction of errors in agreements subject to statutory
formalities
German law does not recognise a rule similar to the parol evidence rule.108
However, it does recognise a presumption in favour of the completeness and
accuracy of a document, which is even stronger in the case of agreements
which must be reduced to writing.109 As in South Africa, sales of land110 and
suretyships111 are typical examples of agreements subject to constitutive
formalities in German law. Nevertheless, this jurisdiction also allows these
and other written agreements to be brought into line with the parties’ actual
intentions when, by virtue of a mistake, the former do not constitute an
accurate recordal of the parties’ consensus.
A German court will use one of two methods to correct a written
agreement. The ﬁrst is to approach the problem as a type of mistake in
expression, and to solve it according to the old Roman maxim falsa
demonstratio non nocet: a false description does not vitiate the contract. The
maxim allows the court to consider the parties’ actual agreement, which then
prevails over the words used in the contract. It is relied upon in cases which
would be labelled as rectiﬁcation for a common or unilateral mistake
respectively in both English and SouthAfrican law. Thus, where the contract
describes the land to be sold as parcels 31 and 32 but the parties actually
intended that parcel 33 should also be sold,112 the parties’ common intention
would take precedence over the incomplete description in the contract.
Similarly, the falsa demonstratio principle would also be applicable where the
written agreement indicates that parcels 31, 32 and 33 are sold, but the seller
only intended to sell parcels 31 and 32 and the purchaser concluded the
agreement knowing of this intention. In such a case, effect will be given to
the mistaken party’s intention and the written agreement will be correct-
ed.113
The falsa demonstratio principle as applied in German law presupposes
that there is in fact an inaccurate or insufﬁcient description of a term in the
contract. However, it also appears that when an essential term of the
agreement subject to constitutive formalities is omitted from the contract, a
German court will use the Andeutungstheorie (‘theory of indication’) to
108 Stefan Vogenauer ‘Interpretation of contracts: Concluding comparative obser-
vations’ inAndrewBurrows & Edwin Peel (eds) Contract Terms (2007) 135.
109 Ibid at 138.
110 § 311b BGB.
111 § 766 BGB.
112 BGHZ 87, 150 (25-03-1983) at 152–5.
113 BGH NJW-RR 1993, 373 (translated inVogenauer op cit note 108 at 142).
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determine whether there is some ‘indication’ of or allusion to this omitted
term in the contract itself.114 If there is such an allusion, the court will permit
evidence of external circumstances to discover whether the parties had in fact
agreed upon the omitted term.115 As a second step, the court will then
determine whether the contract is formally valid in light of these external
circumstances. The justiﬁcation underlying this approach is that evidentiary
certainty is trumped by the belief of the parties that they have concluded a
valid agreement.116
Thus, the German approach is to characterise situations where the
document does not accurately represent the parties’ intention as a matter of
interpretation or construction. In principle, all extrinsic evidence is admissi-
ble in order to determine whether a written agreement is valid and what it
means.117 In common-law jurisdictions, as in South Africa, this particular
problem cannot be dealt with in the same way, precisely because of the
existence of the parol evidence rule. However, an examination of the way in
which rectiﬁcation proceeds in these common-law jurisdictions also indi-
cates that a court will ﬁrst rectify an agreement before determining its formal
validity.
(ii) The common-law approach to the correction of errors in agreements subject to
statutory formalities
Unlike South African courts, common-law courts do not hesitate to rectify
an agreement subject to formalities, even when the documented recordal
fails to comply with them. This was not always the position: until the
authoritative decision in Joscelyne v Nissen,118 it was unclear whether a
document recording an agreement subject to statutory formalities could be
rectiﬁed to give effect to a prior oral agreement or common intention or
whether the fact that these did not constitute a valid contract precluded such
a claim.119
114 Vogenauer op cit note 108 at 138–9.
115 See for example Rainer Kanzleiter ‘§ 311b’ in Wolfgang Krüger (ed) Münchener
Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch Schuldrecht 2 Allgemeiner Teil: §§ 241–432 5 ed
(2007) note 64.
116 Ibid.
117 Vogenauer op cit note 108 at 135; Birke Häcker ‘Mistakes in the execution of
documents: Recent cases on rectiﬁcation and related doctrines’ (2008) 19 King’s LJ
293 at 306–7.
118 [1970] 2QB 86.
119 If SouthAfrican law did indeed receive the remedy of rectiﬁcation from English
law (as a corrective to the parol evidence rule), then the South African courts pre-
ceded their English counterparts in the relaxation of at least one of its requirements.
In Weinerlein supra note 24 at 285 per De Villiers JA, it was held that a party need not
prove the existence of a prior, validly concluded contract in order to succeed with a
claim for rectiﬁcation of a subsequent recordal — proof of a prior agreement was
sufﬁcient. This requirement was further relaxed in Meyer supra note 7 at 253 so that
proof of a prior common intention (rather than an agreement or contract) would
sufﬁce. The distinction between a prior agreement and a common intention is dis-
cussed inMyburgh op cit note 33 at 197–224.
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The introduction of the ‘prior common intention’ requirement in
common-law jurisdictions now allows a court to rectify the document so
that it complies with the relevant legislation rather than because it does so.
Therefore, even where essential terms have been omitted from the docu-
ment, these terms may be inserted,120 provided only that the traditional
requirements for rectiﬁcation have been met.121
This phenomenon may be explained on the basis that the relevant
legislation usually prescribes different consequences for non-compliance
with statutory formalities. For example, s 4 of the English Statute of Frauds,
1677 provides that when a guarantee (a suretyship in the SouthAfrican sense)
does not contain all the terms of the parties’ agreement, that guarantee is
merely unenforceable, rather than void. This means that
‘[t]he statute, in fact, only provides that no agreement not in writing and not
duly signed shall be sued on: but when the written instrument is rectiﬁed there
is a writing which satisﬁes the statute, the jurisdiction of the court to rectify
being outside the prohibition of the statute’.122
Unenforceability means that English courts do not have to grapple with the
apparent legal problem of rectifying a document which simultaneously
constitutes the agreement between the parties and appears to be a nullity.123 It
allows a court to recognise that there is an underlying agreement or intention
and to rectify a document which does not represent that agreement or
intention accurately. Unlike their South African counterparts, furthermore,
English courts are not faced with the apparent difﬁculty of distinguishing
between the consequences of non-compliance with statutory formalities and
the failure to record an agreement accurately. As the above quotation
illustrates, the relevant legislation makes it clear that non-compliance leads to
unenforceability; since rectiﬁcation is aimed at the correction of the
120 Edwin Peel Treitel’s The Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 191, 348; Caroline N
Brown Corbin on Contracts 4: Statute of Frauds §§ 12.1–23.11 (1997) § 14.22; Ameri-
can Law Institute Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts (1981) § 156 (where it is
stated that there is no meaningful distinction between errors of commission and those
of omission); United States of America v Motor Trucks Ltd [1924] AC 196; Craddock
Brothers v Hunt [1923] 2 Ch 136; GMAC Commercial Credit Development Limited v
Kalvinder Singh Sandhu, Kewal Singh Sandhu [2004] EWHC 716; Hughes v Payne 22
SD 293, 117 NW 363 (1908); Calhoun v Downs 211 Cal 766, 297 P 548 (1931);
Whiting v Diver Plumbing & Heating Ltd [1992] 1NZLR 560 569; Jireh Customs Limited
v Clode [2008]NZHC1665.
121 In Swainland Builders Limited v Freehold Properties Limited [2002] EWCACiv 560
para 33, the court listed these requirements:
‘(1) the parties had a common continuing intention, whether or not amounting to
an agreement, in respect of a particular matter in the instrument to be rectiﬁed; (2)
there was an outward expression of accord; (3) the intention continued at the time
of the execution of the instrument sought to be rectiﬁed; [and] (4) by mistake the
instrument did not reﬂect that common intention’.
122 United States of America supra note 120 at 200–1, per the Earl of Birkenhead.
123 Peel op cit note 120 at 193 states that the contract can be concluded orally, but it
can only be enforced if the contract has been reduced to writing.
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document and not its enforcement, a court which grants the remedy does not
circumvent the prohibition of the relevant statute.124
Admittedly, not much can be gained from attempting to compare the
consequence of unenforceability with that of nullity.125 Something which is
void is non-existent, and not merely incapable of being enforced.126
Nevertheless, there are certain common-law statutes which prescribe
invalidity for non-compliance with statutory formalities. The ﬁrst is s 2(1) of
the English Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions)Act, 1989. Unlike its
South African equivalent however, the Act also makes speciﬁc provision for
the rectiﬁcation of a deed in order to make it comply with statutory
formalities.127 The fact that this remedy is statutorily permitted in spite of the
fact that the agreement is void may suggest that the legislature was not aware
of, or disagreed with, the idea that one cannot rectify a void agreement. This
makes a direct comparison between the South African and the English
approach on the point somewhat difﬁcult, although if the South African
approach was as self-evident as the courts assume it to be, one would have
expected some academic or judicial commentary on the apparent change in
position adopted by the English legislature.128
The California Civil Code is another statute which prescribes invalidity
when certain agreements have not been reduced to writing.129 While the
Code also contains a provision relating to the rectiﬁcation of agreements, it
does not explicitly authorise the rectiﬁcation of a void agreement in order to
comply with formalities.130 It is therefore useful to note how a Californian
court would approach this issue.
In Oatman v Niemeyer131 the Supreme Court of California was asked to
rectify a deed of sale which failed to describe the property that was the object
of the sale. It held as follows:
‘There can, of course, be no question but that the deed was void in law, that is,
that it failed wholly as conveyance of property since no property was described.
124 GMAC Commercial Credit Development Limited supra note 120 para 58.
125 Tager op cit note 103 at 14–15makes the same observation.
126 See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Insolvent Estate Botha t/a ‘Trio Kulture’ 1990
(2) SA548 (A) at 565D–F.
127 Section 2(4).
128 The change in position refers to the fact that prior to the promulgation of the
Act, contracts for the sale of land were governed by the Law of Property Act, 1925
which prescribed unenforceability in the event of non-compliance with statutory
formalities. The imposition of nullity was a product of the English Law Commission’s
recommendations in Formalities for Contracts for Sale etc of Land (Law Com No 164)
(1987) paras 1.4–1.9. Despite the fact that non-compliance with statutory formalities
now renders an agreement for the sale of land void, the Law Commission conﬁrmed
in para 5.6 that rectiﬁcation would also be available under the new regime, without
any comment on the apparent contradiction or inconsistency, at least from a South
African perspective, in the notion that a void agreement may be rectiﬁed.
129 § 1624.
130 § 3399 simply reiterates the general common-law rules relating to rectiﬁcation.
131 207 Cal 424, 278 P1043 (1929).
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But the contention that, for that reason, it cannot be reformed fails to
distinguish between a contract which is void for some fundamental reason and
an instrument or writing which is void because of mistake in its preparation. If
the contract itself is void, as, for example, because it is immoral or because the
parties have not agreed on all of its terms and there is, for that reason, no ﬁnal
contract or understanding between them, . . . reformation is impossible, since
there is no valid contract to reform. But this is entirely different from a case
where there is a valid contract and the parties have endeavored to put it in
writing, and have made a mistake in writing down its terms, or have
endeavored in accordance with the contract to execute an instrument, such as a
deed, for the purpose of carrying it out and, through mistake in the preparation
of the instrument, the document fails, either wholly or partially, to accomplish
such purpose. The instrument may be void in such a case because of the
mistake, but there is still a valid contract; and the contract being valid, equity
will reform the instrument to make it what it should be, and would have been
except for the mistake. There is no making of a new contract in such a case.
There is but the making of a new instrument, either to correctly express the
contract or to carry it into effect.’132
This portion of the judgment is quoted in full as an illustration of a more
tenable approach to the problem. First, it indicates that even where
formalities are constitutive, a logical distinction can be drawn between the
document (instrument) and the underlying agreement or contract. Secondly,
it illustrates that rectiﬁcation of a document which does not comply with
formalities does not necessarily lead to the inescapable conclusion that a court
is investing a void transaction with validity. In these circumstances, ‘[t]here is
no making of a new contract’, but the correction of the document or deed
which inaccurately reﬂects that contract. Finally, it places the correct
question in the foreground: is the agreement that the parties concluded (and
not necessarily its recordal) valid, or void?
The approach in both common- and civil-law jurisdictions as described
above maintains a better balance between the need to promote the functions
of statutory formalities and the need to give effect to the parties’ true
intention. Logically, a document should ﬁrst be corrected before one can
determine whether it complies with the requirements for validity, both
formal and substantive, and is therefore enforceable.133 In German law, all
extrinsic evidence is admissible in order to determine the content of a written
agreement. If this evidence indicates that there has been a mistake in the
recordal of the agreement, the falsa demonstratio principle and the Andeu-
tungstheorie allow effect to be given to the parties’ true intention. Only
thereafter does a court determine whether the corrected agreement is
(formally) valid or void. This is also the procedure followed in common-law
jurisdictions, at least insofar as it relates to rectiﬁcation: ﬁrst correct the
document and then determine its validity once corrected. Of course, this
132 Oatman supra note 131 at 426–7.
133 Brown op cit note 120 at 234–6. See also Van der Merwe et al op cit note 19 at
157.
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does not mean that a document will always be rectiﬁed when it does not
comply with formalities; it simply places the emphasis, correctly it is argued,
on the true issue, which is whether the requirements for rectiﬁcation have
been met. Whether the difference in emphasis between the South African
approach on the one hand, and the common (and civilian) approach on the
other, has any effect on the policy issues underlying the imposition of
formalities is considered next.
IV THE SECOND JUSTIFICATION: EX FACIE COMPLIANCE
AND THE FUNCTIONS OF FORM
The rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to constitutive formalities involves
two conﬂicting principles.134 The ﬁrst, which underlies rectiﬁcation, is that
effect must be given to the true agreement between the parties. The other is
that the functions of statutory formalities should not be circumvented. In
Magwaza, the court opted to give greater weight to the second principle and
held that the rectiﬁcation of an agreement which does not comply with
constitutive formalities opens the door to fraud, possible perjury and
unnecessary litigation.135
As a general rule, South African courts do not consider the policy
considerations underlying formal requirements when determining whether
an agreement subject to formalities should be rectiﬁed, perhaps because there
is an assumption that formal validity automatically precludes the subversion
of such functions. This is certainly the impression created in Magwaza,136
where the court very brieﬂy mentioned that in order to promote the
evidentiary function fulﬁlled by formalities, effect must be given to the plain
wording of the relevant statute. This statement was made without consider-
ing the fact that while a document may appear to record a formally valid
agreement, a mistake in that recordal renders the document inaccurate
evidence of the parties’ agreement. A document containing an incorrect
description of land, for example, is no better evidence of the parties’
agreement than a document which contains no description at all. Further-
more, there appears to be an inherent contradiction in an approach which
stipulates the requirement of formal validity as a precondition to rectiﬁcation
in order to prevent uncertainty and disputes and then allows rectiﬁcation of
that document, when the remedy in itself opens the door to uncertainty and
disputes.137 Subsequent decisions, if they mention policy issues at all, have
simply proceeded on the same assumption of automatic subversion as
justiﬁcation for the decision that a particular agreement cannot be rectiﬁed,
without investigating whether the facts really merit such a conclusion.
134 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 256A, per Squires J.
135 Magwaza supra note 1 at 1029F.According to Friedman J in Thathiah v Kahn NO
1982 3 SA370 (D) at 375B–C, this is the true ratio of that decision.
136 Magwaza supra note 1 at 1029E–F.
137 Vogel NO supra note 88 at 558F–G.
THE SA APPROACH TO THE RECTIFICATION OF AGREEMENTS 813
This point is illustrated by a closer examination of the decisions in
Republican Press and Intercontinental Exports. In the former case, the court
justiﬁed its strict approach on the following basis: the majority, per Hurt J,
emphasised that the Magwaza decision amounted to a clear policy statement
that the intention of the legislator should prevail over the equitable remedy
of rectiﬁcation.138 The fact that giving effect to this intention may lead to
anomalous results was not, according to the court, sufﬁcient justiﬁcation for
adopting a ‘lenient’ approach in determining whether a document should be
rectiﬁed.139 Although Intercontinental Exports represents a less strict approach
(by recognising that a document is formally valid when it is reasonably
capable of an interpretation consistent with validity) the court nevertheless
supported the majority decision in Republican Press.140
The following comment has been made about these two decisions:
‘Chance may determine whether the transcription error in question, in
addition to giving the same name to two parties, introduces a slight difference
into the name thereby allowing the principle of Intercontinental Exports to
operate or whether the name is identical so the case falls within Republican Press
(Pty) Ltd.’141
This criticism is convincing when considered in the context of the policy
considerations underlying the imposition of formalities.142 In neither Repub-
lican Press nor Intercontinental Exports did the court consider whether its
decision promoted the functions of formalities. From this perspective, the
latter decision fails to do so any better than the former. In both cases, the
document before the court constituted incorrect and misleading evidence of
the true agreement between the parties. In addition, and although this is
rarely mentioned in cases dealing with formalities,143 the cautionary function
of formalities had been fulﬁlled: the document in each case had been reduced
to writing, thereby (presumably) giving the respective sureties an opportu-
nity to consider the obligations they were undertaking. When considered in
this light, the different decisions (and approaches) in these two cases, while
possibly strictly logically correct, do seem arbitrary.
138 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 253B.
139 Ibid at 255B–E.
140 Intercontinental Exports (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 para 16.
141 C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s The Law of Suretyship 5 ed (2002) 71. This
opinion is expressed again in the sixth edition (C F Forsyth & J T Pretorius Caney’s
The Law of Suretyship 6 ed (2010) 76n73). See also Minette Nortje ‘General principles
of contract’ 1999 Annual Survey 154 at 171; Jopie Pretorius ‘Surety issues: A survey of
recent cases’ (2006) 14 JBL 164 at 168.
142 However it does lose sight of the difference in the facts of the respective cases:
companies cannot have the same names (Republican Press) while natural persons can
and do (Intercontinental Exports).
143 The minority judgment in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 proves to be
one of the few exceptions. Squires J alluded to the cautionary function of formalities
when he said that ‘[t]he relevant party, in the form of the surety, has addressed himself
and his mind to the completion of the document, but erroneously also recorded the
creditor’s name as that of the principal debtor’ (at 259I–260A).
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But what of decisions permitting rectiﬁcation where the document creates
the impression of substantive invalidity? Do they, by limiting the ambit and
effect of the ﬁrst step, subvert the functions of formalities by recognising that
there is an agreement independent of the document which records it? While
possibly contrary to the rule that the document is the sole manifestation of
the parties’ agreement, it is suggested that these cases appear to promote at
least the evidentiary function of formalities, since the document once
rectiﬁed constitutes accurate evidence of the parties’ agreement.
This recognition that an inaccurate recordal constitutes misleading evi-
dence of the parties’ true intention, and should be corrected for that reason,
appears to underlie the application of the falsa demonstratio principle and the
Andeutungstheorie in German law. In the context of the sale of land, the
comment has been made that where there is an inaccurate description of the
subject-matter, it is (usually) only the evidentiary function of the document
which fails; the function of writing as a means to warn and inform the parties
is nevertheless fulﬁlled.144 This being the case, the document may be
corrected in order to present an accurate record of the parties’ agreement. A
similar argument appears to underlie the common-law approach. For
example, it has been stated that
‘[t]he theory of reformation is that the instrument already is subjectively — ie,
to the parties — what they supposed it to be, and therefore that the statutory
requirement of writing is, subjectively at least, satisﬁed; and that the ‘‘reforma-
tion’’ is needed only to make the instrument appear to all the rest of the world as
it appeared (and therefore legally was) to the parties when they signed it.’145
It is therefore arguable that the requirement of formal validity as a prerequi-
site to the rectiﬁcation of an agreement subject to constitutive formalities is
not only illogical, inconsistently applied and uncertain in its ambit, but also
unnecessary from a functional perspective. Cases like Republican Press and
Intercontinental Exports illustrate that the ﬁrst step does not really promote the
functions of formalities any better than a decision like Litecor Voltex, which
appears to avoid it. In fact, all that these cases really achieve is to ‘demonstrate
the irrelevance of apparent formal validity as a litmus test for the rectiﬁcation
of a formal contract.’146
A more convincing argument would be that constitutive formalities are
undermined when non-compliance with formal requirements reﬂects the
lack of agreement between the parties on a term which is required to be in
writing. Rectiﬁcation in these circumstances would subvert formalities
legislation by opening the door to the possibility of fraud and perjury.
However, this subversion could be prevented through a proper consider-
144 See Kanzleiter op cit note 115 at note 67. Even where this cautionary function
of formalities has failed, the document is nevertheless corrected in order to ensure the
parties’ reliance on the ‘workability’of the contract.
145 James H Chadbourn Evidence in Trials at Common Law by John Henry Wigmore 9
(1981) § 2417(3) p 61.
146 Nortje op cit note 141 at 171.
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ation and application of the requirements of rectiﬁcation. Although it falls
beyond the scope of this article to discuss these requirements,147 it is worth
mentioning that on the facts of Magwaza, there was insufﬁcient evidence that
the seller shared the same intention as the purchaser — it would therefore
have been impossible to prove the existence of a prior agreement or common
intention.148 A similar ﬂaw characterises the agreement of the parties in the
Dowdle case.149
In both these cases, rectiﬁcation would have been inappropriate, not
because the parties failed to record an essential term of their agreement, but
because they had neither agreed upon nor shared a common intention with
respect to that essential term. Rectiﬁcation, if granted, would have resulted
in the judicial creation of an agreement for the parties, rather than the
correction of an error in its recordal.
V CONCLUSION
In this article, I have has considered the South African two-step approach to
the rectiﬁcation of agreements subject to constitutive statutory formalities. I
have focused particularly on the ﬁrst step, which prescribes ex facie
compliance with formalities before a court will consider whether the (other)
elements of a claim for rectiﬁcation have been proved. Two interrelated
justiﬁcations are presented for the ﬁrst step. First, a void agreement cannot be
rectiﬁed and secondly, rectiﬁcation of a formally invalid agreement would be
contrary to the policy considerations underlying the imposition of constitu-
tive formal requirements.
With regard to the ﬁrst justiﬁcation, most courts adopt a form-for-form’s-
sake approach. It is submitted that this emphasis on validity ex facie the
recordal is misplaced, because in addition to being theoretically suspect, the
application of the rule by South African courts is anything but consistent. It is
one thing to argue that the ﬁrst step is required despite the fact that this may
have anomalous results; it is another thing entirely when the requirement
itself is counterproductive and lends itself to the drawing of tenuous
distinctions. Further, despite the current lenient approach to the determina-
tion of formal validity, a case like Osborne suggests that an approach which
stipulates formal validity as a prerequisite for rectiﬁcation is not self-evident.
There is something particularly illogical in requiring a written agreement,
which is by one or both parties’ admission an incorrect record of their true
agreement, to be formally correct before it can be substantively corrected.150
147 However, seeMyburgh op cit note 33 at 197–224 for a detailed discussion.
148 Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 257H–J, per Squires J.
149 Dowdle’s Estate supra note 71 at 348 read with 355. The same argument is also
made in Republican Press (Pty) Ltd supra note 6 at 258A–D, per Squires J; Tager op cit
note 103 at 13–14.
150 J C de Wet & A H van Wyk De Wet en Yeats Die Suid-Afrikaanse Kontraktereg en
Handelsreg 4 ed (1978) 286n55 (the statement is not repeated in the corresponding
passage in the ﬁfth edition op cit note 49: see 323n55).
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Indeed, the South African approach is characterised by a more fundamental
logical ﬂaw and that is that it conﬂates the purpose of rectiﬁcation, which is
the correction of the document, and the future enforcement of the
agreement once corrected.
The second justiﬁcation for the imposition of ex facie compliance with
formal requirements, namely that it promotes the functions of formalities,
amounts to an undue deference to those functions or policy considerations
without acknowledging that such deference may in itself fail to promote
these functions or, in fact, convert them to dysfunctions.151 German courts,
for example, recognise that an inaccurate recordal fails to promote the
evidentiary function and rectify the agreement before considering whether it
is valid. More importantly, a requirement of formal validity before rectiﬁca-
tion may occur seems to encourage, rather than prevent, fraud. The potential
for abuse of the protection offered by statutory formalities exists whenever it
is possible for a party to rely on a defence of statutory invalidity despite the
fact that there is proof of an underlying agreement or common intention.
Common-law courts are aware of this potential for abuse and rectify
agreements subject to formalities so that the legislation does not become ‘an
instrument for enabling sharp practice’.152 The fact that most common-law
legislation prescribes unenforceability rather than nullity for a failure to
comply with statutory formalities does not change the fact that the disadvan-
tages of formalities remain the same and that the relevant legislation in each
case may be abused by unscrupulous parties. South African courts on the
other hand, beyond recognising the possibility that statutory formalities may
be abused,153 seem to ﬁnd themselves unable to devise a consistent solution
to this problem. If the imposition of the ﬁrst step described in this article turns
out to be an obstacle, it is surely incumbent on local courts to re-examine its
necessity.
By creating this artiﬁcial two-step procedure for the rectiﬁcation of
agreements subject to constitutive statutory formalities, South African courts
have promoted an unnecessarily complicated approach to the observance of
statutory formalities on the one hand and their role in rectiﬁcation on the
other. Arguably, a better approach would be for the courts to consider
themselves faced simply with the question whether a document, irrespective
of whether there is ex facie compliance with statutory formalities, should be
rectiﬁed in order to give effect to the parties’ underlying agreement or
common intention. In answering this question, due weight should be given
151 This term is used by Joseph M Perillo ‘The Staute of Frauds in the light of the
functions and dysfunctions of form’ (1973–1974) 43 Fordham LR 39 to describe the
disadvantages of formalities.
152 United States of America supra note 120 at 200; GMAC Commercial Credit Develop-
ment Limited supra note 120 para 53; Steinbach Credit Union Ltd. v Hildebrandt 37 Man
R (2d) 192 (1985) para 20.
153 See for example Magwaza supra note 1 at 1029E.
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to both the functions of formalities and the requirements for rectiﬁcation
throughout the process.154
154 Such an approach would have the added beneﬁt of providing an alternative
solution to the problem of blank spaces in documents recording agreements subject to
formalities. The current South African approach regards an agreement subject to
formalities as void if the document recording it contains blank spaces relating to
material terms and the omission cannot be treated as one of the instances where
extrinsic evidence is admissible (see for example Johnston supra note 19 at 940E–F).
An alternative solution, and one which has already been adopted in certain common-
law jurisdictions (GMAndrews &RMillett The Law of Guarantees 5 ed (2008) 88–92;
Whiting supra note 120 at 569; Jireh Customs Limited supra note 120 at 1665), is to
consider whether the document containing such blank spaces can be rectiﬁed. If the
ﬁrst step were abolished, courts would be free to determine whether the parties had in
fact reached agreement or shared a common intention regarding the content of that
blank space, but had simply failed to complete it by virtue of a mistake.
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